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The Background
Brandt argues that both developed countries (dcs) and
less developed countries (Ides) can gain from a deal
on:
food: world supplies would rise, costs fall, and the
hungry benefit, from redirecting aid and investment,
water-control and fertilisers, towards poor family-
farmers in Ides;
energy: shortages and risks could be alleviated
least expensively by concentrating exploration on
ldcs,2 and conservation on des;
- debt: major default risks for dc banks, shortage of
cash for the lowest-income developing countries (LICs),
and uncertainty and high cost of credit for middle-
income developing countries (MICs), all require
attention;
recycling: if OPEC surpluses are not placed in
Ides to permit extra imports from des (tn-cycling) Ides
will cut their purchases of such imports, and will be
driven towards costly borrowing, reduced growth, or
IMF loans conditional on domestic deflation; then
world demand and incomes would fall.
There is widespread agreement on the 'real' issues:
food and energy. However, three obstacles frustrate
the implementation of Brandt. First is the evasion of
the financial issues: debt and recycling. Second is the
resultant trapped, stagflationary mode of thinking of
some dc politicians and bankers, who come to see
extra ide demandwhether out of aid or out of
recycled oil surplusesas a source of dc inflation, not
of extra real output. Third is the non-involvement of
OPEC in post-Brandt analysis and negotiation.
The financial log-jam has to be broken, the seriousness
of the risks recognised, and OPEC involved in a twin
approach to debt guarantees and surplus placement in
ides. Otherwise the world is headed for deep, prolonged
recession. The long-run causes of that danger are
monetarist contractionism in the financial sphere,
andironically, given the free-market pedigree of
monetarismthe resulting protectionism, in the real-
exchange sphere, of nations in recession. The short-
run trigger will be major defaults on ide debt, inducing
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cumulative cash contraction by the lending banks.
The worst-damaged victims will be the LICs-
Bangladesh, India, the Sahel. They borrow little from
the world's banks and are unlikely themselves to
default, but they will suffer grievously from the
cumulative contraction of aid and trade if MICs do so.
Hence it is imperative to galvanise or improve upon
the diffuse, poorly-articulated systems for implementing
Brandt.3 The starting point is the debt threat. Effective
consolidation here has to be linked with longer-term
recycling. OPEC has to see clear economic benefit
from this joint process.
The Problem
Third World debt: the menace of optimism
'The consensual optimism of professional commentators'4
leads them to oppose 'efforts to create new facilities
with a view to dealing with a generalised I debt j crisis'.5
As the optimists see it, despite 'prophecies of doom,
the international private capital markets have I managed
to function smoothly and to absorb and channel
funds'. The frequency of error has not risen; 'since
1956 there have been 38 multilateral debt renegotiations',
with 'two to three reschedulings a year'7 both before
and after 1973. The World Bank stresses that Ide debts
grew more slowly in real terms in 1973-77 than in 1969-
73; are concentrated on 'few countries, most withj
good growth prospects and reasonably sound economic
management'; and are used in part to build up
reserves.
Yetas the banks recognisepeople who show that
they are 'doing their job' by lending, whether in
regional offices of the World Bank or in foreign
branches of commercial banks, tend towards over-
optimism about repayment prospects. This over-
optimism even extends to 'sensitivity analysis', of the
extra risk of default if various things go wrong. Objective
head-office systems to evaluate default risk are not
used in some banks; are reviewed against experience
in few (where they perform badly); and anyway generate
lending criteria that are 'relaxed when I banks need to
lend',9 eg when they are awash with OPEC cash.
What reasons, apart from pressure to lend, account
for this tilt toward optimism?
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The debt service ratio (DSR) (je the borrowers'
recent burden of debt repayment (capital plus interest)
as a proportion of its recent export earnings) is commonly
used as measure of default risk. The use of average
DSRs for groups of ldcs understates the difficulties of
particular ldcs. li)
Many important debts are omitted from these
DSRs." Short-term loans (for less than a year) are
always left out; few countries report loans to buy
arms; and fewer than one in three of the World Bank's
sample of 'important' borrowers informs it about private
debts that are not publicly guaranteed. The last category
alone, at the end of 1977, was estimated to raise MIC
long-term and medium-term debt from $149.4 million
to $192.6 million, or by 29 per centpresumably
concentrated on particularly risky loans, and hence
with higher interest-rates, shorter maturities, and thus
much greater percentage effect on the DSR'2 than the
29 per cent figure suggests.
It is assumed, after the 1979-80 oil price rises, that
OPEC (and therefore the banks) will have lots of
loanable cash for ldcs with otherwise dangerously
high DSRs. However, such cash will not readily be
placed by OPEC with high-risk banks, or by banks,
especially newcomers, with high-risk customer countries.
OPEC can leave its oil in the ground, or its cash in
gold. Banks can recycle to dcs. Nor can 'swap
arrangements' be assumed to funnel cash smoothly
towards at-risk banks, especially under stress.
Extrapolation from past non-default at a given
DSR is over-hopeful in three ways. First, the proneness
of DSRs to shoot up suddenly is not realised. Second,
the capacity of each MIC, and of the world financial
system ('the market') to handle a given DSR is
overstressed, on the basis of 1973-75 experience. Third,
the factors 'converting' a given DSR, handled in a
particular way, into a repayment crisis are assumed to
be more favourable and more stable than they really
are. This over-hopeful extrapolation overlooks several
points.
The success of 'the market' in avoiding default
after the 1973 oil price explosion was substantially
due to the expansion of aid; partly due to the entry
of OPEC donors, aid rose by 105 per cent in cash
terms between 1972 and 1975, while prices of goods
in aid contracts rose 'only' by 39 per cent." There
seems little hope of a corresponding increase now.
Yet the real price of oil rose by at least 80 per cent
from 1978 to 1980,' implying almost as big a rise in
the MIC's need for balance-of-payments finance as
in 1973-75.
Export volume or price can fluctuate more violently,
or grow more slowly, than expectedturning DSR
up sharply. Even after 1973, primary commodity
price falls severely damaged the creditworthiness of
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the Philippines and Zaire, and bad cotton harvests
had analogous effects in Peru and the Sudan.
e) In particular, and alarmingly, World Bank
projections of ldc exports appear to depend on 'high
case' assumptions regarding growth in des and their
willingness to accept ide imports. Growth of
industrialised countries at 3.3 per cent yearly in
1980-85 and 4.0 per cent in 1985-90, and corresponding
import growth at 4.3 per cent and 5.3 per cent,
seems a hopeful view to take." If it is hopeful, ldcs
lose all ways: export revenues, aid prospects, and
private capital flows all decline. Can they meet debt
then?
d) Whether a country can service debtthe relevance
of a DSRalso depends on its import bill. Oil
prices, harvest fluctuations, and other instabilities
also limit the usefulness of extrapolating from today's
DSR to tomorrow's repayment.
Despite all this, official documents often assume that
improvements in Ides' economic performance under
debt stress are attainable by ide action, will be sufficient
to achieve adequate debt management with likely
future DSRs, and if nothing else, are likely because
necessity is the mother of invention. All three
assumptions are dubious. Debt stress associated with
'Western' protectionism, and with what MICs may
perceive as usury, may instead cause Latin American
MICs, in particular, to concludeconveniently for
their politicians, but not wholly unjustly - that debt
burdens prohibit good domestic performance; that if
attained it will be punished by creditors, (who will
insist on repayment instead of rescheduling); and that
financial respectability is therefore less rewarding
than joint, pre-emptive and orchestrated default.6
The default risk
In the late 1960s, aid comprised over two-thirds of ide
debt. Now it is below one-third. Even the full Brandt
proposais would bareiy raise this share.'7 The new
debt is owed mainly to commercial banks. Unlike
aidor direct and portfolio private investmentthis
new commercial debt is:
very concentrated: seven ides (all MIC5) owe
about half private ldc debt; ten US banks account for
75 per cent of US private claims on ldcs; and a few
banks (directly or via offshore subsidiaries) are heavily
exposed in one or two high-risk ides;'8
quick-maturing, often in two years or less (to
meet $131.3 billion owed to commercial banks by
Latin America on 1 January 1980, its bank reserves
totalled only $54.9 billion, yet $56.7 billion fell due in
1980);'
at full commercial rates, floating up or down with
LIBOR but /4-2½ per cent higher, and often
supplemented by hidden fees or commissions;
seldom directly linked to a project's repayment
capacity: a public guarantee will doand many loans
support consumer imports, or investments that increase
profit at the cost of wages (eg tractors that replace
ploughmen) or of other firms' profits, rather than
raising the recipient nation's GNP and hence repayment
capacity.
In a frightening pyramid of musical chairs, each bank
expects repayments out Of the borrowing countries'
capacity to borrow still more, rather than out of the
yield of the purchases financed by itself. Yet countries'
ability to borrow more is erratic.
Increased world political instability, and its effects on
prices of gold, currencies and oiland on demand for
armscan suddenly divert surplus cash away from
ldcs. 'New lending to non-oil Ides shrank from $12.2 bn
in the fourth quarter of 1979 to $4 bn' in the first
quarter of 1980? Table 1 shows the results of cumulated
borrowing, and of the over-optimism discussed in the
previous section. In Table 2, various risk factors are
shown. This table does not purport to be scientific but
it does bring out several points:
that net oil exporters are sometimes at risk, too;
that copper production goes with a high debt/GNP
ratio;
- that some very weak DSRs are offset by strong
bank positions (but can these be 'mobilised' to meet a
debt crisis?)
that others are offset by large economies (low
ratios of debt service, and of current deficit, to GNP);
that some risky DSRs are made riskier by high
imports (bad current balances of payments) relative to
GNP;
that a few MICs, and even some oil exporters,
score 'Yes' or 'Almost' in alarmingly many columns.
The nature of a possible debt crisis
Too often, the optimists have not been effectively
challenged because the crisis has been specified much
too vaguely. It is not a 'general crisis of capitalism' in
any Marxist sense. It is not that 'the viability of the
international monetary system would be undermined',
or that ldcs' 'failure to meet their obligations will
trigger an international crisis that will endanger the
viability of the international monetary system'.2'
Michalopoulos rightly rejects such blurred images, in
which the world falls off an unspecified cliff, or numerous
big banks cannot repay depositors.
In the likely crisis scenario, two or three large private
debtors among ldcsfaced by dearer oil, depressed
export markets, and poor harvests necessitating food
imports cannot repay, say, three to five major Western
banks. Some $10 bn, which these banks expected to be
repaid, is instead formally defaulted, or must be
'rescheduled'. What does a bank, faced with a big cut
in its cash base, do? It is easiest to answer the question
if we look at it the other way round. By law or by
custom, a bank keeps a prudential 'cash ratio', typically
10 per cent, between cash-in-hand and liabilities to
depositors. If cash-in-hand rises by $10 mn due to
extra deposits, such a bank will raise advances by (100-
10) per cent of $10 mn, ie by $9 mn, and keep the extra
$1 mn as cash. Most of the extra $9 mnin a dc
typically about 80 per centfinds its way as cash
deposits into the banks, permitting a second round of
extra advances: (100-10) per cent of that 80 per cent of
$9 mn or about $6.5 mn. This permits a third round...
and so on; in this quite realistic example, a $10 mn
cash expansion, for a bank, produces an ultimate
credit expansion of $33,3 mn from the banking system.
But a 'cash outflow', such as a default on a loan due for
repayment, 'puts the credit multiplier into reverse,
when it becomes the credit contraction multiplier...
Loans are called, investments are liquidated, and
deposits contract by a multiple'.22 The multiplier of
only 3.3, in the event of a series of defaults of $10 bn
concentrated on loans due to a few banks, is too
optimistic, because the affected banks would have to
call in even more cash: partly to anticipate panic
withdrawals by raising the prudential cash reserve
ratio; partly to make good the cash actually lost
through such withdrawals; and partly to attract funds
by raising interest paid to depositors. A $10 bn cash
contraction due to default could lead to reduction in
lending by the banking system of up to $50 bn. Not
only LICs, but even prime industrial borrowers who
had been relying on renewed accommodations, would
be at risk. Defaults and bankruptcies would echo, not
mainly around banks, but around dc and ldc firms.
It might not in practice be quite that bad. First, the
banks could restore part of the depleted cash ratio by
selling securities, rather than by cutting advances; but
this mainly transfers the cash contraction (to the
buyers of securities) rather than eliminating it. Second,
swap arrangements among banks could achieve
something. Third, OPEC funds could help a little,
though they are unlikely to go to banks, or even lender
countries, over-exposed in defaulting (or 'rescheduling')
Ides; indeed, oil producers, if they lose trust in Western
banks as a whole, will be tempted to leave their oil in
the ground. Fourth, some banks might borrow from
the Central Bank as 'lender of last resort'; but such
credit might well be neither sought (due to its high
price) nor supplied (because banks would be told to
call in risky advances before the Central Bank admitted
a 'last resort' was required). Fifth, des might bale out
affected banks cheaply, or allow IMF to expand SDRs
with similar restorative effect on the credit base; but
would either time during a sudden crisis or monetarism
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permit? In any event, neither central banks nor IMF
lend direct to firms, in dcs or in LICs; and it is firms,
not banks, that are at most serious risk in this scenario.
All in all, general cures after LIC defaults would do
little for these firms, and almost nothing to restore the
lending capacity of the particular affected banks.
Even if it was restored, those banks would receive loan
cash, corresponding to liabilities, which creates less
willingness to re-expand risk lending than does the
return of expected unencumbered cash owned by the
bank itself. Failure of such return, through default or
rescheduling concentrated by a few Ides on a few
banks, would have a large cumulative deflationary
impact. If we are very optimistic, we could hope that
OPEC, swaps, and governmental baling-out would
reduce the contractionary effect of $10 bn LIC non-
repayment upon dcs, from the $50 bn suggested above,
to (say) $35-$40 bn.
How serious is the risk of such defaults? The tables
speak for themselves. In view of recent pronouncements
by such experts as David Rockefeller of Chase
Manhattan, Dr Guth of the Deutsche Bank, the
Governor of the Bank of England, and Peter Peterson,
it is no longer possible to write off these short-term
risks as 'scare scenarios'. What is 'around the corner'
in a non-Brandtian world is not catastrophe for all. It is
a steady series of deflationary shocks, starting from
non-repayments or rescheduling, and multiplied by
the effect of eroded cash upon bank lending. The
worst sufferers will probably be the poorest developing
countries, who borrow little from commercial banks,
but partly depend for their precarious levels of living
upon exports and concessional capital, which recession
erodes.
Solutions, Bogus and Genuine
The problem is both too little credit and too much: too
much loaned in search of quick profits at swift maturity
and high risk, to a few increasingly overburdened
MICs; too little long-term credit, at low but safe real
rates of interest, both to reduce risks to MICs and to
speed development in LICs. Deflationary treatmentless
or harsher creditcould make matters worse. But an
expansionary treatment might just pump more air into
the unsound credit balloons of some MICs, and is
anyway seen by some des as inflationary. Furthermore,
some simple expedients (such as retrospective adjustment
of terms of aid loans) are either exhausted already, or
too weak to help, or palpably unfair. While the short-
run danger has to be tackledby a mixture of guarantees
and credit planning that, nevertheless, preserves some
freedom of responsible action for borrowers and lenders
as well as intermediariesit will recur unless the
underlying issue, long-run credit tn-cycling, is tackled
also.
48
Cutbacks will not do
Brandt rightly rejects a 'solution' that simply cuts back
on private loans. This might indeed raise the share of
'sound' aid in total debt. However, many private loans
do support genuine development. Others are needed
to help debtor nations to refinance older debts.
Nor is there a solution by simply expanding most
current forms of IMF aid. It is too short-term, too
little, and too deflationary in its conditions. The Jamaican
case shows this dramatically. The IMF President, M.
de Larosière, himself recognises it.
The 'Paris Club' and analogous arrangements have
rescheduled private debt about 40 times in 1956-80.
However, the Club has several drawbacks. First, it
could never defuse a widespread threat of possible
defaults, because it acts only if a particular nation's
default is almost imminent. Second, the 'Club' is very
reluctant to reduce the severity of loan terms (as
opposed to extending the repayment period), so that it
buys timea worthy aim rather than solving problems
at root; more seriously, this severe approach puts
more strain on relatively ever-scarcer aid, which can
then be represented as paying ides to repay harsh
private 'risk' creditors. Above all, the 'Paris Club'
normally lends only to ides that accept the IMF's
conditions.24
Hence all these three options aloneless 'unsound'
private lending, more use of the IMF, the 'Paris
Club'drive out the deflationary devil with a perhaps
equally deflationary Beelzebub.
Soundness without tears?
Can an alternative be found, enabling Ides in repayment
difficultiesoften not their fault but due to oil import
prices, depressed export markets, etcto escape without
curtailing growth, and especially without unemploying
and impoverishing their poorest people?2 (Since capital
can move abroad if profits fall, it is likely that
'unemployment and stagnant or declining real wages
are more probable' results of ide deflation.2) Can one
have either
a response, to external debt needs, that mobilises
extra domestic supply of tradeable goods (but not
equivalent import demand), instead of a response that
deflates home demand and hence imports; or else
if there must be a contractionist response, one
that 'sheds its load' on the better-off instead of penalising
mainly the poorest?
For example, could Jamaica and the IMF, in Spring
1980, have agreed on a solution that both enhanced
Jamaica's repayment capacity, and allowed the
Government to pursue socialist, or otherwise egalitarian
and growth-enhancing, policies? 'IMF loans'and the
Paris Club 'regularly require economic policies that
rest on social and political repression. Today, there
are probably no alternative policies that would permit
Ides in trouble to balance their external accounts'.27
Yet neither Communist countries nor relatively
egalitarian capitalist Ides such as Taiwan have had bad
default records.
The imperative - for short-run debt improvement and
hence for IMF actionis to analyse and support
policies permitting Ides to develop 'sounder' debt
positions without savage deflationism and inequality.
This imperative is as much political as economic. In
the world economy, however, it is needed to prevent
the cure for default risks from being as contractionist-
not least of dc economies - as the disease. After all, in
EEC in 1980, 'there would be 3 mn more unemployed
if the non-oil ldcs had cut their manufactured imports
to meet the increased oil prices of 1973-74 rather than
borrowing'.2" There is a massive Northern interest, as
Brandt stresses, in avoiding contractionist knee-jerk
responses in debt crises by, and to, the South.
Currently favoured approaches
The deflationary cures to an ides short-run debt crisis
can be worse than the disease. No acceptable domestic
solution via supply expansion, or deflation of demand
confined to the rich, has yet been devised (though I
think this is a possible task). Three possible approaches
are favoured instead.
The first approach involves aid debt forgiveness. Already
'retrospective terms adjustment' has softened past aid
loans to LICs from most des, and already the grant
element of new aid is well over 90 per cent. Some
progress could be made if the USA accepted terms
adjustment, and if Japan raised its grant element.
However, such improvement in aid:
would be small in effect;
could be at the expense of more aid;
would rightly stress the LICs, not the MICs where
the main debt problem lies;
could divert aid from ides and dc banks; why should
not the risk-takers sometimes lose their own money?
The second approach takes off from this final, somewhat
moralistic objection. To avoid bankruptcies, bankers
often give 'debt relief. . . out of enlightened self-
interest'.29 Can such specific remedies perhaps be
anticipated and generalised? Under a guarantee scheme,
both banks and direct OPEC lenders would trade in,
say, half their ide credits (not, of course, just bad debts
chosen by them!) in return for bonds, guaranteed but
bearing much lower interest. Whether the guarantor
would be ¡MF, the World Bank, or a mixed or new
institution is a secondary but important issue. So is the
balance of finance for such a scheme, as between
lenders (acting as mutual insurers), borrowers and
international organisations.3° In any case, it is an
inadequate argument, against such a scheme, to claim
that it is a general remedy, whereas crisis threats are
particular to countries and general systemic collapse
is vague and implausible.-1' As explained, the problem
lies in the international transmission of deflation,
starting from particular Ide defaults, via particular
banks' cash-ratios, to multiple, general credit con-
tractions by banks. The globe does not fall off a cliff; it
gradually deflates! Debt guarantee systems can greatly
reduce these risks.
The missing link: hi-cycling
The third currently-favoured approach involves 're-
cycling' of OPEC funds towards desor, if to Ides,
largely as a way to meet extra oil bills. Neither method
suffices to secure the long-term credit base for world
expansion.
Straight recycling of OPEC cash to des alone would
leave Ides with 'no relief for their massive trade deficits'.
That would compel a 'decline in ide exports to the
Ides I and thus imperil I the fragile economic recovery
of the West'. Unfinaneed ide deficits 'could also force
a moratorium on payment of the outstanding private
and official debt by the ides'.72
OPEC recycling to ides, fully matched by increased
purchases by ides of OPEC oil, leaves no extra cash to
expand ide imports from des. Indeed, it compels
contraction of such imports, as interest on OPEC
commercial debt builds up. Further, it assumes no
attempts by, or for, ides to replace imported fossil
fuels. Since ide growth would further expose ail these
raw inadequacies of a simple recycling procedure,
they render such growth that much less likely.
There are three requirements to restore balance, in a
way neither deflationary nor inflationary, to OPEC,
dc and Ide trading positions, after oil revenues transferred
to OPEC from des and Ides rise sharply:
- to enable OPEC to place its extra cash in sound
investments (commercial or concessional) in des and
Ides, both to enable them to buy sufficient oil and to
permit ides, in early development, to run import
surpiuses with des;
to enable des to export more to ides and to
OPEC, thus converting an almost unmanageable
balance-of-payments strain into an easily-manageable
small sacrifice (of domestic consumption to production
for exports);
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- to enable ides to run the current-account deficits
needed to continue growth - je to expand imports
from des, and not to contract rapidly the volume of oil-
based importswhile building up the sectors that will
eventually produce the exports (or replace the imports)
to repay the debts and to eliminate the deficits.
OPEC must therefore be involved in any programme
of 'massive transfers' to Ides. Ldcs will have to use
substantial parts of those transfers to buy extra dc
exports. And des will have to sacrifice some consumption
to make those exports, and hence at first to pay for
dearer imported oil, but increasingly for the balance-
of-payments costs involved in investments in domestic
energy conservation, exploration and development.
This is tricycling: OPEC funds to ldcs to buy dc
exports; the extra dc revenue (from exports to Ides) to
maintain, then partly replace, imports of OPEC oil;
the Ides' extra OPEC funds, in part, to buy extra goods
from des (and in part to service OPEC loans).
The empty chair
Tn-cycling and debt guarantees the long-run solution
and the shortneed each other. Brandt rightly stresses
the gains to des and Ides. But the empty chair, at the
post-Brandt discussions, has been that of OPEC. If
OPEC is absent, so is the ultimate creditor in a tri-
cycling process, and the party to whom most risky
debts are ultimately due.
What would be the costs and benefits to OPEC countries
from a Brandt-style settlement? Much the same as to
the intermediary banks. They would gain international
guarantees against default, financed partly as mutual
insurance, partly by new special funds (to be raised,
perhaps, by the World Bank). In return, they would
lose:
some freedom to select objects and customers for
lending (clearly loans can be guaranteed only if their
quality is controlled);
as debt was funded, some of the risk-premium
implicit in the former high interest rates;
some corresponding power to search out high
interest-rates on risky loans.
Given present risks, that seems a good deal for OPEC.
It should also be possible, with such guarantees, to
steer much larger shares of OPEC tn-cycling towards
the really poor countries of South Asia and Eastern
and Central Africa. In any event, many senior civil
servants in such countries (notably India) regard
'deflation via default' as their main single international
nightmare, and its prevention as their top priority for
world financial reform, even thotjgh their own countries
are not now and may not be in future major borrowers
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from private banks. But there will be no remedy unless
OPEC fills the empty chair.
There has been some tn-cycling. OPEC's aid, as a
proporton of GNP, has been generous (but declining,
concentrated on a few, mainly Arab or Moslem,
MICs; and insufficientunless supported by large,
private flowsto cope with, say, the $60 bn deficits of
oil-importing Ides in 1980). Nor has OPEC's chair
always been empty. The International Fund for
Agricultural Development is a classic institution for
tn-cycling, with OPEC, Northern donors, and ide
recipients equally represented. OPEC countries have
participated in regional development banking; have
organised their own banks for development investment
overseas; have channelled cash to banks lending (but
often riskily) to ldcs; and have, to a small extent,
invested in Ides directly. But most of these processes
are one-off, small, unintegrated, and above all unlinked
to a general post-Brandtian search for a new credit
dispensation. Nobody can be sure that, lacking such a
dispensation, the deflationary menace of echoing defaults
will come to pass. But the risk is big, and serious,
enough to require OPEC - in its own interests, not just
in the Brandtian 'common interest' of des and ldcsto
fill the 'empty chair' in global negotiation about the
whole Brandt package, financial and real.
Why the Silence?
Why has this crucial issue been so little discussed?
First, it is because obvious ways outIMF, the Paris
Club, fewer or 'sounder' private loansare thought by
some to be sufficient, and realised by others to be
insufficient. The former see no need for discussion.
Many of the latter see nowhere to go.
Second, it is claimed that the massive extra OPEC
surpluses of 1979-80, as in 1973-76, can be successfully
placed by the banking system. However, this is the
same over-aggregative wishful thinking that led to the
refusal to recognise a 'debt problem'.3 'OPEC as a
whole' may seek to place vast, growing surpluses in
'ides as a whole' through 'the banking system', while
particular countries providing major OPEC cash,
especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, place no new
cash in pai-ticular banks seen as over-exposed in
particular Ides.
Third, some people argue that discussions of debt
crisis will, by reducing 'confidence', cause what they
discuss. This assumes that bankers and lenders are
unaware of the issues. It is more probable that matters
will reach disaster point through neglect than through
open analysis.
Inflation or reflation?
The main reason why des have been reluctant to
discuss these issues seriously, however, is the fear of
renewed inflation as extra ide cash is spent. Many
sceptics do not see a shared Western interest in higher
Ide purchasing-power. They argue as follows: 'the last
thing that monetarist dc governments, terrified of
renewed inflations, want is extra monetary demand.
Why should they revive the inflationary dragon by
throwing dc taxpayers' cash at ldcs, while taking
unpopular measures to dry up cash flows at home'?
There are two rejoinders, one 'global' and the other
'local'. Globally, monetarismwhatever its virtues in
explaining the rate of inflation in one countiycannot
account for world-wide inflation during recession,
expecially with floating exchange-rates among main
trading currencies. It is more plausible to interpret
events since 1973-74, world-wide, as follows. Oil price-
rises greatly inflated costs, but deflated domestic
demand, in dc and ldc oil-importers. Many also had
cost-inflationary transmission systems, allowing non-
competing groups of workers and their employerswith
near-monopoly control over coal, or garbage-clearing,
or medical servicesto pass on higher prices and
costs. Governments, failing to restrain either cost-
push (by cutting oil imports) or cost-transmission (by
controlling, or getting agreement among, monopolists
of key forms of labour or of outputs), have desperately
responded to real cost-inflation by monetary demand-
deflation. While enough of such nasty medicine can
work, the patient may die first. Meanwhile, deflation
of national demands for non-oil impol-ts transmits
recession internationally, stimulating the cry for
protection. To the extent that this analysis is rightand
only a t'en' dogmatic monetarist would deny it major
elements of truthultra-monetarist objections to
Brandtian 'Ide reflation' are reminiscent of the man
who, having murdered his parents, seeks clemency on
the grounds that he is an orphan.37
There is also a 'local' rejoinder. Suppose we accept
that genera/ised extra demand for dc products as a
whole, while expectations remain inflationary, will
generate inflation rather than extra real output, even
in recession. Cannot extra ldc demand for a des
exports nevertheless induce more real growth, and
less inflation, than extra demand from other des or
from domestic sources? During recession, some dc
sectors suffer much more severe cutbacks than others.
In particular the investment-goods sectors suffer severely.
If recession reduces expected growth of real GNP
from four per cent yearly to two per cent, and if each
unit of output requires three units of extra capital,
then net investment falls from 12 per cent of GNP to
six per cent.39 Massive spare capacity in investment-
goods (and to a lesser extent other producer-goods)
sectors is thus created, even if all the consumer-goods
sectors experience is a gentle slow-down in growth.
Hence extra export demand, if steered to the industries
experiencing especially severe recession (steel,
machinery, construction), will 'find' many half-idle
machines and specialised workers; to re-employ these
will not create excess demand for labour (bidding up
wage-rates), and may even cut unit production costs.39
There is good reason to expect ide purchases from
des, especially out of aid or carefully-supervised bank
loans, to be geared much more towards acquisition of
investment-goods than is the case for 'any old' extra
demand. Hence the balance between induced growth
and induced inflation, for des, is likely to be especially
favourable if the inducing agent is extra demand from
Ides.4°
One must agree with the IMF view: 'Increased financial
aid . . . could increase global demand and thus contribute
to a reactivation of world trade in a recovery of
production. There is nothing in the present state of
deflationary chain reactions in the industrialised world,
stagnation feeding inflation, which would argue against
such an increase in financial aid.4' Aid is a stabilising,
necessary, but small part of reliable 'massive transfers'.
These, in turn, are only one component of the post-
Brandtian package: debt guarantees (and softenings),
tri-cycling, energy, food.42 But fear of renewed dc
inflation should not deter prompt work on the restoration,
mainly through tii-cycling twinned with the restructuring
of Third World debt, of Ide demand for dc exports.
Few forms of reflation have a better prospect of
expanding output, rather than price-levels, in des.
Few, if any, carry such serious risks if not undertaken.
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Table 1
Debt Positions of Selected Developing Countries, 1978 and 1979
debt service ratio debt service current A/C position with commercial
(%) ± GNP (%) balance of banks at 31 December 1979
payments ± ($mn)
GNP(%)
artificially low due to rescheduling.
Sources and methods: cols 1, 4: World Development Report 1980 (hereafter WDR), pp 134-5; cols 2-3, 5: non-attributable
information on debt-service/export ratios, plus (for colS) WDR. p 119, on export/GNP ratios; col 6: WDR, pp 110-1 for GNP, pp
134-5 for current balance of payments (before debt interest). (Note that col 6 excludes current debt service; it also excludes capital
repayments, which are on capital account; hence cols 5 and6 can be added to estimate the drain on reserves, or new borrowing not
corresponding to new asset creation, required of the country as a percentage of GNP); cols 7-9: Bank for International Settlements.






















Bangladesh 11.7 11.8 12.0 -1.3 -0.9 -4.0 385 85 36
India 9.4 9.8 8.7 -0.8 - +0.8 3,873 908 336
Kenya 8.3 14.9 10.8 -2.4 -4.0 -9.8 1,173 755 224
Pakistan 12.2 12.4 13.8 -2.1 -1.2 -3.1 747 900 435
Tanzania 7.4 7.0 7.2 -1.1 -1.1 -11.3 175 232 96
Middle-Income
Oil Importers
Argentina 26.8 37.1 25.5 -3.5 -3.6 +5.0 8,108 13,427 6,946
Brazil 28.4 50.6 66.5 -2.2 - -2.8 8,466 38,617 11,279
Chile 38.2 45.8 42.6 -7.3 -9.6 -4.4 2,408 4,864 1,980
Colombia 9.8 11.9 10.9 -1.7 -1.7 +1.4 3,897 3,560 2,163
Ivory Coast 14.1 20.1 23.3 -5.9 -7.6 -8.1 751 2,429 748
Korea (S) 10.5 11.3 11.4 -3.9 -3.8 -1.1 3,239 11,968 6,712
Morocco 18.7 19.7 24.8 -4.3 -3.5 -8.2 1,061 3,381 645
Peru 31.1 455* 41.8* .74* 10.0* +1.0 1,780 3,751 1,894*
Philippines 13.4 26.6 18.1 -2.8 -5.1 -4.3 2,986 7,381 3,925
Senegal 14.9 14.9 15.4 -5.4 -4.8 -6.2 120 368 156
Sudan 9.4 9.4 20.2 -1.4 -1.4 -1.0 505 960 493
Thailand 3.7 16.1 10.3 -0.9 -3.4 -5.0 1,642 3,696 2,368
Turkey 11.0 26.7* 30.2* 0.9* 1.8* -2.2 1,199 3,928 1,388*
Yugoslavia 3.2 12.3 16.6 -0.7 - -1.6 2,134 8,247 1,866
Zaire 31.3 32.6 10.6* 6.5* ._ +1.6 905 1,259 398*
Zambia 20.8 34.9 28.4 -7.1 -11.2 -7.5 289 565 258
Oil Exporters
Algeria 20.9 23.0 25.7 -5.9 -6.2 -13.4 3,049 9,044 1,310
Bolivia 48.7 60.1 37.9 -8.5 -10.2 -11.1 250 1,432 676
Egypt 22.2 22.2 18.8 -8.7 -4.7 -3.5 4,166 2,217 1,274
Indonesia 13.0 16.7 16.7 -3.1 -3.5 -1.5 5,162 5,806 2,273
Malaysia 8.8 9.8 5.3 -4.6 -5.0 +2.0 3,302 2,235 818
Mexico 59.6 66.2 31.4 -6.9 -7.4 -1.1 8,013 30,914 10,679
Nigeria 1.2 2.0 1.8 -0.3 - -8.2 1,967 3,461 1,017
Venezuela 6.9 9.6 10.6 -1.9 - 2.8 -12.2 14,196 20,804 1,260
Table 2
Default Risk Factors
sprobably would be yes' but for rescheduling.
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debt service ratio: 1979 1978 end-1979 end-I 979
25%+ 1978 ratio debt service current bank bank
in 1979 under- GNP ratio BOP reserves reserves less









Kenya no yes no yes (9.8) no no
Tanzania no no no yes (-1.3) no no
Middle-Income Oil Importers
Argentina yes (25.5) yes no no no no
Brazil yes (66.5) yes no no yes (22%) yes
Chile no yes yes (9.6) no yes (49%) no
Ivory Coast almost yes yes (7.6) yes (8.1) yes (31%) almost
S. Korea no no no no yes (27%) yes
Morocco almost no no yes (8.2) yes no
Peru yes (42) yes yes (10) no yes almost*
Philippines no yes yes almost yes yes
Senegal no no almost yes yes yes
Thailand no yes no yes yes yes
Turkey yes yes no no yes yes
Yugoslavia no yes no no yes no
Zaire no no no? no no no*
Zambia yes yes yes (11) yes (7.5) almost almost
00 Exporters
Algeria yes no yes yes (13) yes (34%) no
Bolivia yes (38) yes yes yes (11) yes (17%T yes
Egypt no no almost no no no
Mexico yes no yes no yes (26%) yes
